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ORIGINAL RESEARCH ARTICLE

A Stitch in Time Saves Caribbeanization:
Meta-steering and Strategic Coordination in
an Era of Caribbean Trans-Regionalism
Tavis D. Jules
Loyola University Chicago
Abstract: This article sets out to theoretically explain the Caribbean
Community’s (CARICOM) integrative stalemate. It argues that this
needs to be studied in light of a changing regional, geographic, and
geostrategic climate. A shift is occurring from ‘endogenous
regionalism,’ which concentrates on the Caribbean’s historical past,
to ‘exogenous regionalism,’ which focuses on creating a borderless
Caribbean space and promotes Caribbeanization through the
Caribbean Single Market (CSM), which came into force in 2006, and
the stalemated Caribbean Single Economy (CSE). I argue that new
trans-hemispheric relations are emerging and Caribbean regionalism
is now both multi-centric—arising from actions in numerous places
rather than a single center—and also multi-temporal. In this context,
mature regionalism presages effective governance by focusing on
deepening regional structures and institutional arrangements. I
argue that trans-regionalism is a multidimensional process that
moves away from the spill-over effects of trade policy harmonization
and streamlines different political, security, economic, and cultural
regimes. I conclude by suggesting that ‘meta-steering’ in the form of
‘strategic coordination’ or ‘first order response’ is but one way to
perceive the paused regional project.
Keywords: Caribbeanization; Meta-steering; Trans-regional
Regimes; CARICOM; Trans-regionalism
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In this paper, I suggest that a novel proverbial expression—‘A
stitch in time saves Caribbeanization’—accurately captures the
fatality inherent within proclamations about the current state of
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM). The consequence is that we
have not discerned that the political project of Caribbean
regionalism is currently gated, an important sign of which is a
return to old protectionist measures, while the functional process
of regionalization is actually thriving.1 In other words, one needs to
distinguish between de jure state-driven ‘regionalism’ and de facto
market-driven ‘regionalization’.2 In this context, two binary schools
of thought are emerging: on the one hand, ‘Caribphiles’ who assert
that a politically integrated CARICOM is the way forward, and, on
the other, ‘Caribsceptics’ who call for de-regionalization.3 However,
both agree that a shift is occurring from ‘endogenous regionalism,’
which concentrates on the Caribbean’s historical past, to
‘exogenous regionalism,’ which focuses on creating a borderless
Caribbean space and promotes Caribbeanization through the
Caribbean Single Market (CSM), which came into force in 2006, and
the stalemated Caribbean Single Economy (CSE).
The idea of Caribbeanization is not new. We can trace its
heredities to numerous attempts at establishing ‘regional political
projects,’4 dating back most notably to the Windward Island
Federation from 1833 to 1958,5 the Leeward Islands Federation
from 1671 to 1956, and the West Indian Federation from 1958 to
1961.6 In this line of succession, CARICOM has been successful at
promoting production integration based on cooperation and
solidarity among the small (and micro) economies of its members.7
While pure market-based integration has stalled, it has been
resuscitated continually, with the latest defibrillation attempt
applying the characteristics of open regionalism such as trade
liberalization and structural diversification to increase production
integration of goods, services, and capital.8 In other words, the
movement towards ‘structured integration of production in the
Region’ is aided by the governance mechanism of mature
regionalism.9 In this paper, then, mature regionalism is seen as
functioning on the legal basis of the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas. It is therefore defined as a governance mechanism
and not as a political process, and it calls for deeper structures,
rather than wider integrative efforts, in order to facilitate collective
decision-making that ensures national legislative commitment to
regional decisions and agreed-upon objectives.
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I suggest that mature regionalism presages effective governance
by focusing on deepening regional structures and institutional
arrangements. This is different from earlier attempts at regional
deepening, in that mature regionalism calls for the management of
the integrated economic space, while open regionalism focuses on
trade liberalization across all sectors.10 As such, I see mature
regionalism as being driven by collaboration and cooperation at
the ministerial level since several factors negate the
implementation deficit of regional decisions at the national level.11
Thus, I advance that a trinity of events categorizes the current
implementation deficit or ‘Caribbeansclerosis’—i.e. the stagnation
of Caribbean integration.12 This has occurred as member states are:
mindful of multilateral agreements forcing them to extend trade
liberalization; seeking additional preferential market access to
facilitate new trade and investment requirements; and attentive
towards reducing potential trade diversions caused by other
agreements negotiated with third parties, such as the United States
(US) and European Union (EU).
This article sets out to theoretically explain CARICOM’s
integrative stalemate. It argues that this needs to be studied in light
of a changing regional, geographic, and geostrategic climate. In
essence, Caribbean leaders are using antiquated theoretical
constructs to understand a relatively new phenomenon—that is,
Caribbean regionalism has increasingly metamorphosed beyond its
original conceptualization of integrated production to a common
market and now into a prospective single, integrated economy.
Using the idea of ‘first-order response’—meaning ‘strategic
decisions about how to adjust to the emerging nature of the new
regional political economy’13—and the concept of ‘transregionalism’,14 I suggest that new trans-hemispheric relations are
emerging. These are multidimensional forms of integration with
different degrees of ‘regionness’. Also, I suggest that CARICOM is
now engaged in trans-regional relations, which is why a
reconceptualization of the spaces and scales across which it
functions is necessary.
The problem with suggesting that the Caribbean Single Market
and Economy (CSME) has paused is that the economic processes of
integration have done so due to political implementation deficits.
Yet this article notes that, while the monetary aspect of the
integrative project has indeed paused, the ‘functional spaces’ are on
track. In order to make this point, I draw on regime theory to
provide a way of undressing the manifestations of the wide array of
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interregional relations that exist today.15 The focus here is on the
structural constraints actors face and their response. I also review
the ways through which CARICOM has historically viewed
regionalism and suggest that in an era of trans-regional
interdependence, Caribbean regionalism is now both multicentric—arising from actions in numerous places rather than a
single center—and also multi-temporal, involving, what Bob Jessop
calls ‘an ever increasing density and, hence, a more complex
restructuring and re-articulation of temporalities and time
horizons’16 across different scales that are ‘operationally
autonomous but substantively interdependent systems’.17 I
conclude by suggesting that ‘meta-steering’18 in the form of
‘strategic coordination’19 or ‘first order response’ is but one way to
perceive the paused regional project.
THE CHANGING HEMISPHERIC CLIMATE:
FROM SUB-REGIONALISM TO TRANS-REGIONALISM
A significant number of hemispheric agreements now define the
shift from ‘government to governance’20 or ‘government to metagovernance (or, better, meta-steering)’.21 In this era, which is
frequently defined as ‘governing without governance’,22 CARICOM
countries simultaneously participate in new hemispheric
agreements while at the same time taking part in their own
process, the CSME. These agreements are reinforcing transhemispheric relations, and forming new layers of dialogue and
cooperation across Latin American and Caribbean countries. I
suggest here that trans-regionalism is a multidimensional process
that moves away from the spill-over effects of trade policy
harmonization and streamlines different political, security,
economic, and cultural regimes.
In spite of hemispheric peculiarities, an overall pattern of
enlargement and amalgamation is bolstering regional as well as
preferential trade agreements. Since more than half of current
world trade takes place within actual or prospective regional
trading agreements, trans-regionalism is a geostrategic exploit that
takes political attention away from the multilateral issues dealt
with in the World Trade Organization (WTO). At the same time, as
countries now belong to customs unions, economic blocs and have
signed numerous Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) that have very
different trade rules—typically being implemented across different
periods—with both neighbouring countries and other blocs, FTAs
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foster a range of phenomena: Cross-Regionalism;23 Transoceanic
Agreements;24 Polilateralism;25 Competitive Regionalism;26
Additive Regionalism;27 or Regionalism Without Regions.28
Several CARCIOM members now have agreements with more
than one ‘hub’,29 agreements that are anchored in legally binding
rule-based commitments that advocate structural reforms and thus
run counter to the aims and goals of the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas. Trans-hemispheric and trans-regional relations
differ from South-South regionalism in several ways. On the one
hand, south-south regionalism is categorised by (i) trade-based
regionalism and it is inward-orientated, (ii) regional trade
agreements (RTAs), (iii) bipolarity, (iv) traffic reductions, and (v)
south-south cooperation based on technical transfer. On the other
hand, trans-regionalism is based on (i) cooperation and
multilateral market-driven consensus, as exemplified, in the TransPacific Partnership (TPP) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank, (ii) multipolarity, and (iii) outward-oriented and driven by
open regionalism. Thus, trans-regionalism can be seen as an
archetypical first-order response to a changing global environment
by subsuming elements of South-South regionalism (collaboration
and cooperation) into its processes and procedures, and adding
global ‘micro-networking links between various communities
(government, business, civil societal).’30 Moreover, the new global
landscape that is dominated by ‘post-spaces’ also requires new and
innovative forms of institutional and structural governance
mechanisms. Put more properly, trans-regionalism is slowly
becoming the new orthodoxy since the emerging and frontier
markets are seeking effective policy instruments as they insert
their national economies into an era of post-2015 development
agenda, post-financial crisis and global recession, post-Ebola
epidemic, and post-Arab Spring.
The Changing Face of Regional and Hemispheric Integration
The crusade towards clearer governance mechanisms to regulate
CARICOM, as attempted in the Rose Hall Declaration on Regional
Governance and Integrated Development,31 is a standard strategic
maneuverer by member states to move against the global trend by
reaffirming statehood. As Jessop has discussed more broadly, such
action by states does not
cede their claim to sovereignty in the face of growing complex
interdependence and [did not] seek to enhance their political
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capacities by participating in hierarchic coordination mechanisms
or devolving some activities to private institutions and actors, [that
would] seek to shape and steer these mechanisms through metasteering practices. 32

In fact, the Rose Hall Declaration reaffirms that CARICOM is a
community of sovereignty states, and continues to legitimize
principles
of
‘proportionality’
and
‘subsidiarity.’
The
proportionality
principle
emphasises
that
‘institutional
arrangements devised for Community action shall not exceed what
is necessary to achieve’33 actions specified in the Revised Treaty.
The principle of subsidiarity, which supports the principle of
proportionality, stipulates that regional acts ‘would not be pursued
in cases where action by individual Member States is sufficient to
achieve the specific goals of the Community’.34 In fact, later in the
article, I argue that CARICOM’s function has been relegated to that
of ‘strategic coordination’35 in an era defined by ‘meta-steering’
(constitutional or institutional design)36 and the proliferation of
new governance mechanisms (mature regionalism) across all of its
core pillars (functional cooperation, economic integration, foreign
policy coordination and security).
Historically, sub-regionalism in the form of the Organisation of
Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) was accepted as part of the larger
regional project as it did not threaten economic integration.
Moreover, as the OECS has a functioning economic union and
monetary coordination, it presents an example of how the larger
Caribbean integrative project could function. In essence, subregionalism has been tolerated since it does not contradict the core
principles of Caribbean integration in that six of the seven full
members of the OECS are also members of the CSM.37 In 1994,
when all of CARICOM’s members agreed to be members of the
proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA)—which was an
extension of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)—
the future of neoliberalism and the ability of CARICOM countries to
be integrated into the global market with the backing of this new
trade powerhouse looked great until it was stalled.
Hemispherically, up until 2000, the regional political projects
within Latin America and the Caribbean were separate and
oriented along cultural, ethno-linguistic, and colonial geographic
lines. This changed when Belize joined the Sistema de la Integración
Centroamericana (SICA).38 In 2010, four years after the CSM
formally came on-stream in 12 of 15 CARICOM countries, regional
leaders increasingly perceived new ‘existential threats’ that
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challenged the economic prosperity, food security, and ecological
balance of integration projects.39 Guyana and Suriname joined
the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which combined
two existing customs unions, namely the Southern Common Market
(MERCOSUR) and the Andean Community of Nations (CAN). In
2011, 13 CARICOM states were among the 33 countries that signed
the Declaration of Caracas, creating the Community of Latin
American and Caribbean States (CELAC) with its focus on deeper
integration.40 In 2012, Haiti, Suriname, and St Lucia acceded to the
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA), a
socialist project of which numerous CARICOM members—AntiguaBarbuda, Dominica, St Vincent and the Grenadines—had long been
members.41 Additionally, CARICOM countries belong to other
regional zones promoting economic cooperation: all are members
of the Association of Caribbean States, and nine CARICOM countries
belong to the Sistema Económico Latin-American y del Caribe
(SELA).42 Then there are other projects such as PetroCaribe: a
Venezuelan subsidized-credit scheme for oil now linked with ALBA,
which accounts 12 of the 15 CARICOM members.43
Coupled with this cross-pollination of political projects, new
hemispheric initiatives—such as the Pacific Alliance, which links
free-trading Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico together—are on
the rise, just other movements are declining. A clear example is
ALBA: a particular vision of Latin American integration is failing as
the body’s influence wanes in the aftermath of the death of Hugo
Chávez. In fact, the proliferation of regional bodies in Latin America
and the Caribbean does not effect a more amalgamated region.
Rather, it highlights how economic trading blocs are perceived as
inefficient and governments are trying to keep their hands in all of
the regional pies, so to speak.
This new faith in regionalism is a sign that governments are
looking for safe havens in a period of protracted uncertainty and
instability. Moreover, the retreat towards the regional level follows
the patterns of the 1970s and 1980s that created the Caribbean
Basin Economic Recovery Act, which focused on providing traffic
reduction and trade benefits. As then, so too now, the changing
global environment means that Caribbean regionalism will face its
own ‘insurgences’ as questions around its legitimacy arise. Among
a number of different factors, there is, in particular, a trinity of
forces that are reshaping the region at the present moment.44 First,
US foreign policy is now pivoting more towards Asia in the form of
the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) while the Caribbean is no
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longer seen as having the geostrategic importance it once did.
Second, China is slowly replacing America as the primary
benefactor in the Caribbean as it continues to expand its influence
via state lending, private investments, and outright gifts in the form
of new stadiums, roads, official buildings and ports. At the same
time, more Chinese nationals than ever are working and living in
the region. Third, the conditionalities attached to the European
Development Fund, now in its 10th cycle, and it linkages to the
controversial Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) call for the
abolishment of preferential trade rules.
The changing face of Caribbean integration is not only by choice.
Rather, it is responding to a protracted global environment that is
now defined by a retreat towards protectionism at the regional
level or what has been called the rise of the ‘gated global’.45 In the
case of CARICOM, this has invited speculations that it is an obsolete
regional project. However, in light of our wider argument in the
paper, the issue is not with CARICOM per se but with the ways in
which we have sought to theorize it.
A NEW APPROACH TO STUDYING HEMISPHERIC RELATIONS
Historically, scholars have focused on CARICOM’s deficit of supranationalism owing to a form of inter-governmentalism that, as
Vaughan Lewis put it,
recognises the continuing importance of individual member states
in determining the path of the integration process, as well as to a
neo-functionalism that is premised on the principle of shared
sovereignty or the collective exercise of such sovereignty in
specified areas.46

In seeking to fuse inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism
together, the founding fathers of Caribbean integration sought to
guard against the larger nations taking advantage of the smaller
ones. The idea was that Caribbean countries could hold on to their
sovereignty while coordinating policy decisions when necessary.
Since the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas did not change
CARICOM’s modus operandi, this orthodoxy continues to dominate
its institutional structures and modes of governance. A case in
point is found in the decision-making processes of the organs of
governance: the Conference of Heads of Government and the
Council of Ministers, where decisions necessitate one vote per state
and can be held to Prime Ministerial/Presidential ransom. Neo-
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functionalism is a hybrid of functionalist and federalist theories
that calls attention to the functional mechanisms and goals of a
given integrative project.47 Mention of federalism in CARICOM
invites unease among its members, given the disastrous failure of
the West Indian Federation. Thus, CARICOM has maintained the
mechanisms of neo-functionalism: ‘technocratic decision-making,
incremental change and learning processes’.48
Because inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism are
responsible for the Caribbeansclerosis, I maintain that transregionalism may provide an alternative way of studying—and
theorizing—a Caribbean integration that is slowly being defined by
multi-layered inter-regional relations with hemispheric roots. In
other words, due to its hybrid nature, CARICOM governance
mechanisms—i.e. mature regionalism—constitute a form of metasteering built around structured and strategic coordination.
In the remainder of this section, I suggest that CARICOM should
now be viewed as a trans-regional regime. I also show that transregionalism as a theoretical approach offers genuinely new insight
into the regional processes and governance mechanisms that
CARICOM is now involved in creating.
CARICOM as a Trans-Regional Regime
CARICOM has historically been defined not only by intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism as its formal praxis but
also by its governance modus operandi, which is shaped by two
principal organs: the Conference of Heads of Government of the
Caribbean Community (CHGCC) and its Bureau and the Community
Council of Ministers (Community Council) that are assisted by four
‘Councils’49 and three ‘Bodies’.50
In defining CARICOM as a trans-regional regime, I first draw on
Krasner’s conceptualization of a regime as ‘principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making procedures around which actors’
expectations converge in a given issue area.’51 The defining feature
of CARICOM in this regard stems from the fact that it is demarcated
by its own self-interest, power, and member interactions.52 In
describing it in this way, I acknowledge that CARICOM now
operates in an era defined by institutional governance regulations
that comprise all mechanisms of orientation, coordination, control,
and balancing. These institutional regulations, which advocate
discourse and agreement rather than authority and domination,
are permanent features of the post-bureaucratic age.53 Open at

46 Tavis Jules

their boundaries, trans-regional regimes are horizontal networks
of coordination rather than hierarchical entities. In essence, transregional regimes function in an era where decision-making has
become flattened and stresses meta-decision-making rules instead
of decision-making rules to urge participation and empowerment.
For the post-bureaucratic regime, obligatory pronouncements are
made at the level of strategy—that which unifies all parts of the
system—consequently producing binding proclamations through
this mechanism by demonstrating active collaboration with
others.54
Trans-regionalism is also a defining characteristic of new
regionalism. While it has been applied comprehensively to describe
the group-to-group dialogues of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM)
framework established in 1996, I suggest that inter-regional
arrangements help us to understand why the ‘functional spaces’ of
regionalization in CARICOM have succeeded while the monetary
spaces suffer from disharmony. The plethora of interregional
arrangements beyond the EU’s external relations is expanding
globally. Examples include: ASME; Asia Pacific Economic
Cooperation; African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States;
Europe-Latin America and Caribbean Summit; Africa-Europe
Summit; Forum for East Asia-Latin America Cooperation.55 Interregional or bi-regional group-to-group dialogues, another defining
feature of new regionalism, is the core instrument that promotes
intra-regional cooperation at the ministerial level in the form of
meetings (high-level or technical) and the launching of joint
projects and programs.56 Inter-regionalism challenges the notion of
geographical proximity by recognizing that economic distance no
longer is a defining facet of trade competitiveness.57 Unlike interregionalism—which is categorized by the ‘relationship between
two distinct, separate regions’58 and defined by region-to–region
dialogue to manage economic and political relations59—‘transregionalism implies the establishment of common “spaces”
between and across regions in which constituent agents (e.g.
individuals, communities, organisations) operate and have close
associative ties with each other’.60 Trans-regionalism builds upon
concepts of networked governance61 by singling out a ‘set of formal
and informal institutions that cut across and connect different
geographical regions… through a combination of regional, interregional and bilateral norms and forums’.62
Central to the understanding of trans-regionalism is the
spatiality of functional projects (such as education, health, and
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transportation) that are shaped by social relations and in turn
constituted in spatio-temporal contexts. Thus, such projects within
CARICOM have come to occupy spatio-temporal contexts that range
from structural integration and strategic coordination—which
again range from intersystemic, based on interorganizational
negotiation, to interpersonal networking—for more or less allinclusive regional goals, to the quest for definite CSM interests.
Therefore, the Caribbean regional space is experiencing growing
infiltration (inward flows) and extraversion (outward flows) as it
moves away for trade-based regionalism and towards developing a
single market that is expected to be supported by different regimes
(the movement of goods, labour, capital, services and the right to
establishment) across different spaces that are both regional and
trans-regional.
Dent distinguishes between four categories of trans-regional
spaces that are relevant to the understanding the changing nature
of governance within CARICOM: (i) economic spaces—based on
free trade areas and zones, customs unions and labor market rules
that are part of the CSM; (ii) business spaces—analogous to
economic spaces, but propelled by multinational enterprises that
regulate the production and distribution systems; (iii) political
spaces—overseen by supranational or inter-governmental bodies;
and (iv) socio-cultural spaces—established over time based on
common cultural identities. Although the four components of
Dent’s taxonomy are relevant to the Caribbean, some might also
reasonably assert that the economic and political spaces are in
something of a holding pattern due to Caribbeansclerosis. If we are
to concede that CARICOM now operates in a trans-regional space
with inadequate trans-regional institutions and governance
mechanisms, then we can plausibly acknowledge that the pausing
of the CSM and lacklustre start of the CSE is instigated by structural
inefficacies of a system-wide incapacity rather than a purely
political determination. In other words, the novel network of
entangled regional relations that are driven by economic
transnationalism and open regionalism—in the form or production
integration—is hard to discern. Thus, Caribbean trans-regionalism
is based on the use of horizontal models of governance (i.e. mature
regionalism) through ‘external governance’63 that seek to bind
member states into common policy frameworks.64
Finally, CARICOM’s classification as a trans-regional regime
speaks to how the rise of ‘third generation agreements’ are found
in declarations like Rose Hall that call for deeper integration, which
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by extension, will increasingly incorporate policy areas that were
previously a domestic preserve. Since CARICOM members are now
functioning across different spaces and scales, new institutional
mechanisms are needed to facilitate the complexities that are
arising at the systemic level since new domestic requirements are
generating greater need for the management of multiple and varied
commitments. Membership of different blocs implies the
acceptance of highly differentiated trade rules that can be both
complementary to, and in conflict with, CARICOM’s core mandate.
Therefore, we speak of a pausing of Caribbean integration as it
necessitates that we differentiate between the systemic level
complexities of the regional project itself and the rule-making
requirements that undergird the processes of regional integration.
Moreover, CARICOM’s characteristics of as a trans-regional regime
also speak to the fact that it is no longer only responsible for blocto-super power negotiations—i.e. with the US or EU—but must
also negotiate with other Southern blocs, including those of which
some, many, or all of its members might be part.
In summary, CARICOM’s instrument of open regionalism and its
governance mechanism of mature regionalism has given a very
different form of integration to that found, for example, in
Southeast Asia—which Jayasuriya calls ‘embedded mercantilism’.65
It is distinguished, at least in part, with its focus on ensuring that:
critical policy decisions of the Community taken by Heads of
Government, or by other Organs of the Community, will have the
force of law throughout the Region as a result of the operation of
domestic legislation.66

This in turn has paved the way for trans-regionalism. It implies that
a new trans-regional space now exists since the two regional
projects are concurrently strategically coordinating the spatiotemporal horizon in the Caribbean. In essence, the Caribbean space
has been constructed around a hybrid instrumentality that implies
that open regionalism and deeper integration (mature regionalism)
must work simultaneously to spur national development through
regional means, while considering that its members may have
competing and conflicting interests since they are parties to other
integrative blocs.
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Something Old, Something New, Something Mature and Something
Blue
The trans-regional space that I argue exists in CARICOM can also be
viewed as a ‘functional space’. This notion implies a space based on
the coordination of governance, funding, provision, and regulation
of the functional areas of regionalism, such as education and health.
Against the backdrop of neoliberal capitalism, today’s international
system dictates that virtually all countries need to be members of
at least one bloc as we have moved away from the protectionist
and interventionist post–World War II system of closed or inwards
regional modules—that used import substituting development in
the form of the Common External Tariff [CET]67 as the basis for
development—to a more open or outward model of regionalism,
that gradually reduced external tariffs on goods from non-member
countries, while preserving duty-free access on intra-regional
trade.
CARICOM is fundamentally a product of the old regionalism of
the 1960s and 1970s that was premised upon developing trade and
dismantling tariffs with countries at more or less similar levels of
development, geographic propensity and proximity. To support
this form of preferential trading system, the Caribbean Common
Market (CCM) was developed as an instrument within the
parameters of 1973 Treaty of Chaguaramas. As an instrument to
stimulate national development, the CCM emphasized importsubstituting industrialization, and, like several other blocs, it also
experienced negligible implementation of its proposed policies.
This implementation deficit and its stalemate was also driven by
the four pestilences of the 1980s:68 the oil crisis of 1973/74 and the
oil shock of 1977, along with the ensuing debt fatigue; the
structural adjustment crises of the 1970s that led to public sector
reforms in all of CARICOM’s member states; (the evaporation of the
preferential market for Caribbean goods (sugar, rice, rum, and
bananas); and the political fragmentation/ideological pluralism,
that stymied economic integration.69 By the end of the 1980s, with
the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, Caribbean leaders sought
to renew ‘ideological and policy convergence among member
states’70 by calling for the revision of the ‘three Common Market
Instruments required by the Treaty of Chaguaramas—the Common
External Tariff, the Rules of Origin, and a Harmonised Scheme of
Fiscal Incentives’71 to facilitate the establishment of the Caribbean
Single Market and Economy (CSME).
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In order to re-conceptualize CARICOM as a trans-regional
regime that needs to function in a trans-regional space, researchers
must recognize that the current challenges that the ‘third wave of
regionalism’ or the ‘new regionalism’ bring to the Caribbean basin
are vastly different from those of the old regionalism—or even
open regionalism—that dominated the agenda in the 1990s as the
CSME was being conceived. In fact, new ways of thinking need to be
developed that recognizes this, noting that while the name of the
political project has changed the aim remains the same. Moreover,
since the explicit call of Rose Hall Deceleration for deeper
integration, CARICOM leaders have failed to take account of the fact
the they are applying a new regional governance mechanism—i.e.
mature regionalism—to a system that was built upon and around
supporting open regionalism in the form of production integration.
Above all, they have not acknowledged that, at the heart of new
regionalism, is a drive for competitiveness, not simply between
blocs but within them as well.
The new trend of reciprocal agreements encompassing large
swaths of countries that fear exclusion has become a distinctive
feature of the negotiated and regulated world that is governed by
the WTO. New modes of regionalism are driven by a recognition
that, ‘in addition reducing tariffs and quotas, effective integration
requires the removal of other barriers, or what has come to be
known as “deep integration”’.72 Yet regionalism—in the Caribbean,
at least—is still viewed as something of a panacea for development.
RETHINKING CARIBBEAN INTEGRATION
Caribbean leaders may wish to train their focus on a different type
of governance that adequately captures the complexities of intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, while at the same time
promoting open regionalism (as called for under Grand Anse)
through the mechanism of mature regionalism. Such an approach
would rely on the use of meta-governance (organization of selforganization) across spatio-temporal horizons and contexts.
Such an approach, which focuses on organizing and balancing
different forms of coordination of complex reciprocal interdependence, has also been describe by Jessop as ‘meta-steering’,
which means ‘the use of higher-order mechanisms to calibrate
different modes of steering (markets, states and other forms of
imperative coordination, networks).73 Meta-steering is not simply
advanced here as a panacea for Caribbean integration but rather as
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an instrument that may help to manage the complexity and
plurality of ‘interdependencies without undermining the basic
coherence and integrity of the (national) state’.74 When embedded
in strategic coordination, meta-steering has the potential of
‘exploring how one operationally autonomous system can influence
the operations of another such (relatively closed) system by
altering the environment in which the latter reproduces itself and
also examines how governance mechanisms might shape their joint
evolution’.75 In other words, meta-steering is but one way of
explaining how the Caribbean regional project can influence the
operations of hemispheric regional groupings and the governance
mechanisms involved.
The functional spaces within CARICOM have not only created
successful institutions under close regionalism—such as the
regional University of the West Indies and the West Indies Shipping
Association76—but in an era of new regionalism that glorifies trade
liberalization, new institutions and programs have arisen as a
consequence of ‘new mutualism’.77 Here, such new mutualism is
seen as being premised upon deeper cooperation and coordination
since it ‘operates as a policy way of thinking, acting, and being at
the regional level’78 and it is defined by three aspects: its multisectoral approach; the adoption of international targets; and the
establishment of regional benchmarks. The point is that neofunctional or functional mechanisms of Caribbean regionalism
continue to drive the economic dimensions. Thus, advances gained
in the former, which are outside of the traditional institutional
arrangements that are now a permanent feature of CARICOM, show
that ‘cooperation on domestic policies can substantially increase
the gains from forming a trade bloc’.79
The free movement of Caribbean nationals has been clarified
recently by the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ)—an institution of
new regionalism—in Myrie vs The State of Barbados, which
determined that all CARICOM nationals have the right to travel
freely within the Community with stays up to six months. There are
only two exceptions: if a national is seen to be undesirable, or if the
person is in danger of becoming a charge on the public purse.80
Consequently, the CCJ has given de jure credence to policy
integration (in the form of intensified functional cooperation),
which is the principal instrument of regional coordination,
harmonization, and acceptance.81
In the changing nature of globalization and regionalism, the
small and micro-states of the Caribbean should be seen no longer
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just as parts of regional blocs, but as parts of trans-regional
hemispheric ones. If we accept this idea, it is not plausible to assert
that Caribbean integration has paused in light of the post-financial
crisis and global recession. Rather, we may think of CARICOM’s
pause in going ahead with the monetary aspects of regionalism as a
way to reconcile inter-governmentalism and neo-functionalism on
the one hand, and, on the other, two aspect that are not necessarily
in conflict with each other: open regionalism, which aims at
widening the community, and mature regionalism, which is geared
towards deepening it.
What is required in this time of pause is treaty amendments
aimed at establishing new pillars of inter-governmentalism more
complementary to the wave of neo-functionalist cooperative
endeavors. Conceptually, the CSME calls for the creation of a large
market space to intensify competition as the community complies
with the unilateral and multilateral commitments assumed under
the WTO.82 Like everything else, CARICOM has been cautious in
trying to keep its hands in all possible pies. While unilateralism is
not a guarantee for CARICOM countries to receive reciprocity from
other trading partners, multilateral liberalization provides security,
but it is a lengthy process. In essence, Caribbean integration may
now be categorized as a ‘labyrinth of exceptions and derogations’83
that is besieged by rules of origin that conflict with the Treaty and
impedes joint negotiating efforts with third countries.
As a consequence, new regional organizations are needed to
establish cross-border supervision, since economic openness
renders CARICOM economies vulnerable to external shocks caused,
for example, by wild fluctuations in commodity prices. The
problem is that while intra-regionalism is no longer the aim of
CARICOM’s integrative project, it continues to function under a
protective common market module that does not support the aims
of the CSME, which calls for competitive production both intra- and
extra-regionally as well as hemispherically. Thus, new questions
will arise that will warrant the attention of the CCJ. For example,
how will it address Treaty violations that may occur if a member
state belongs to several hemispheric blocs with different
implementation rules? Or, if CARICOM nationals move to a member
state that is also a part of another bloc, what rules govern their
movement and their right of establishment across a non-CARICOM
country? Such questions require not only the re-thinking of the role
and function of CARICOM’s integrative instruments but also a new
way to conceptualize a CARICOM that is evolving in an era of dis-
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harmonization, an ill-fated Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA)
that has not delivered on its promise, along with sub-regional
deepening and hemispheric widening.
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTOR
Tavis D. Jules is an Assistant Professor of Cultural and Educational Policy
Studies and Comparative and International Education at Loyola University
Chicago. His research focuses on educational policy formation and
development—particularly, but not exclusively, within the Caribbean.
More recently, his research has focused on analysing the impact of
regionalization upon small (and micro) states, as well as education in
transitory space with a geographic focus on the Maghreb Region. His
recent book Neither world polity nor local or national societies:
Regionalization in the Global South–the Caribbean Community was
published by Peter Lang in 2012. Email: tjules@luc.edu and Twitter:
@tavisdjules

NOTES
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

‘The World Economy: The Gated Globe,’ The Economist, accessed at
http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21587384-forward-marchglobalisation-has-paused-financial-crisis-giving-way.
See Gamble, Andrew, and Anthony Payne, eds. Regionalism and world order.
London: Macmillan, 1996; Shaun Breslin and Richard Higgott, ‘New
Regionalism(s) in the Global Political Economy. Conceptual Understanding in
Historical Perspective,’ Asia Europe Journal, 1 (2003), 167–182..
Tavis D. Jules, Neither World Polity nor Local or National Societies: Regionalization
in the Global South - the Caribbean Community (Berlin: Peter Lang 2012).
Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Introduction: Governing the Asia Pacific--beyond the ‘new
regionalism,’’ Third World Quarterly, 24 (2003): 199–215.
This meant that Windward Islands and Tobago were under the control of the
governor of Barbados.
The West Indian Federation was established under the British Caribbean
Federation Act of 1956, with the aim of promoting stronger economic ties and
establishing a political union among its 10 members – Antigua and Barbuda,
Montserrat, the then St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla (Leeward Islands), Dominica,
Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Vincent (Windward Islands), Jamaica, Barbados, and
Trinidad and Tobago.
Historically, unlike market-based integration, production integration which
privileged goods and to lesser extent services calls for an active state focused on
integrating trade and production through industrial complexes and programing
such as Caribbean Food Plan and the Caribbean Industrial Programming Scheme.
Norman Girvan. ‘Production Integration: A Critical Perspective,’ in Production
Integration in CARICOM: From Theory to Action, eds. Denis Benn, & Kenneth O. Hall
(Kingston: Ian Randle Publishers, 2006),.8-29.
CARICOM. ‘Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing the Caribbean
Community Including the CARICOM Single Market and Economy.’ CARICOM
Secretariat, Georgetown, Guyana (2001).

54 Tavis Jules

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18
19
20

21

Earlier attempts at deeper regionalism saw deeper regionalism as a statecentered process that excluded non-state actors.
Vaughan A. Lewis. Report of the Technical Working Group on the Governance of the
Caribbean Community, St. Augustine: Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, 2006.
While the revised treaty defines CARICOM as a ‘Community of sovereign States it
also stipulates that the decisions of the Heads of Government are ‘binding’,
However the problem is that decisions taken at the ministerial level are rarely, if
at all, implemented. See Jules, ‘Neither World Polity.’; See Also Denis Benn,
‘Strategic Positioning Of The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) In The Changing
Global Environment,’ in Caribbean Community: The Struggle For Survival, eds.
Kenneth Hall and Myrtle Chuck-A-Sang (New York: Trafford Publishing, 2012),
20-35.; Barbara Lorna Vandyke , ‘Caribbean Integration: Theoretical Challenges,’
(Master’s Thesis, The University Of The West Indies, 2011); Helen McBrian, ‘Open
Regionalism: CARICOM Integration and Trade Links,’ in Regional Integration in
Latin America and the Caribbean: The Political Economy of Open Regionalism, ed.
Victor Bulmer-Thomas, (London: ILAS, 2001), 275-294.; Shelton Nicholls et al.,
‘Open Regionalism and Institutional Developments among the Smaller
Integration Schism of CARICOM, the Andean Community and the Central America
Common Market,’ in Regional Integration in Latin America and the Caribbean: The
Political Economy of Open Regionalism, ed. Victor Bulmer-Thomas (London, ILAS,
2001) 141–164.; Anthony Payne and Andrew Gamble. 1996. Introduction: The
political economy of regionalism and world order. In Regionalism and world
order, ed. A. Gamble and A. Payne, 1–20. New York: St Martin’s Press.; Norman
Girvan, ‘Rally Round the West Indies,’ in Remarks at the Launch of the Caribbean
Community: Beyond Survival, ed. Kenneth. O. Hall, (Kingston: Ian Randle
Publications, 2001); Norman Girvan, ‘Is ALBA a New Model of Integration?
Reflections on the CARICOM Experience,’ International Journal of Cuban Studies 3
(2011): 157–180.
Jean Grugel and Anthony Payne. ‘Regionalist Responses in the Caribbean Basin.’
National Perspectives on the New Regionalism in the South. Hampshire: Macmillan
Press & UNU/WIDER (2000). 198-220.
Alexander Beets, ‘The Global Governance of Migration and the Role of Transregionalism,’ in Multilayered Migration Governance: The Promise of Partnership,
eds. Rahel Kunz, Sandra Lavenex, and Marion Panizzon, (New York: Routledge,
2011), 23-45.; Christopher M. Dent, ‘From Inter-regionalism to Transregionalism? Future Challenges for ASEM,’ Asia Europe Journal, 1 (2003): 223–
235.; Joongi Kim, ‘Sub-regionalism, Regionalism, Trans-regionalism. Implications
for Economic Integration,’ Asia Europe Journal, 1 (2003): 183–196.; Weiqing Song,
‘Regionalisation, Inter-regional Cooperation and Global Governance,’ Asia Europe
Journal, 5 (2007): 67–82.
In employing regime theory the units of analysis that I use, states, are not viewed
as being functional differentiated but structurally driven.
Bob Jessop, ‘The Political Economy of Scale and European Governance,’ Tijdschrift
Voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 96 (2005) 225–230.
Bob Jessop, ‘The Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix and the Tendential
Ecological Dominance of Globalizing Capitalism,’ International Journal of Urban
and Regional Research, 24 (2000): 323–360.
Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,’ 334
Ibid.
R. A. W. Rhodes, ‘The New Governance: Governing Without Government,’ Political
Studies, 44 (1996): 652-667.,
Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,’ 354

Caribbean Trans-Regionalism 55

Jon Pierre, ‘Introduction: Understanding Governance,’ in Debating Governance:
Authority, Steering, and Democracy, ed. Jon Pierre (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000), 1-10.
23 Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto V. Fiorentino, ‘The Changing Landscape of Regional
Trade Agreements’ (paper presented at World Trade Organization, Geneva,
Switzerland, 2005). Accessed at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/discussion_papers8_e.pdf.
24 Free trade initiatives based on trade provisions FDI and service that span
different oceanic areas (see Nicolas Péridy, ‘The New Trans-Ocean Free Trade
Initiatives: Estimating Export and FDI Potentials From Dynamic Panel Data
Models,’ Economics Bulletin, 6 (2004): 1-12.)
25 Used to justify why a country should conclude trade agreements with different
countries and trade blocks (both geographically close and distant)
simaintainiously (see Luis De Sebastian ‘Trading Blocs and The Stranded
Countries’ in Whither EU-Israel Relations?: Common and Divergent Interests, eds,
Ephraim Ahiram and Alfred Tovias (Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1995), 147-64.
26 ‘Competitive regionalism’, is a ‘model of governance [with its own that
emphasizes the importance of economic competitiveness and the regional
dimension of socio-economic development’ (See Glenn W. Harrison, Thomas F.
Rutherford, and David G. Tarr, ‘Trade Policy Options for Chile: The Importance of
Market Access,’ The World Bank Economic Review, 16 (2002): 49–79.; Luis
Abugattas, Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl: Challenges for Developing Countries
under the ‘New regionalism’ (‘New York: United Nations, 2004),
27 Defined as country who negotiates bilateral free trade agreements with all of its
significant trading partner (see Harrison et al., ‘Trade Policy Options for Chile,’
49-79.
28 Alfred Tovias, ‘The Brave New World of Cross-regionalism’ (working paper, CEPII
Research, 2008).
29 Tovias, ‘The Brave New World.’
30 Christopher M. Dent, ‘From Inter-regionalism to Trans-regionalism? Future
Challenges for ASEM,’ Asia Europe Journal, 1 (2003): 224
31 ‘The Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance and Integrated Development,’
Caribbean Community Secretariat, July 2-5, 2003, accessed at
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/meetings_statements/rose_hall_d
eclaration.jsp?menu=communications.
32 Bob Jessop. ‘Hollowing out the ‘nation-state’ and multilevel governance,’ A
handbook of comparative social policy (2004): 11-25.
33 Lewis, ‘Report of the Technical Working Group,’ 5.
34 Lewis, ‘Report of the Technical Working Group,’ 5.
35 Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal,’ 323-360.
36 Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal,’ 323-360.
37 While Montserrat is a founding member of CARICOM, it is also a British Overseas
Territory and has not been given permission as yet to accede to the Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas and participation in the CARICOM Single Market.
38 Central American Integration System.
39 ‘Are Caribbean Countries Facing Existential Threats?,’ Norman Girvan, accessed
at http://www.normangirvan.info/girvan-existential-threats/.
40 Members of CELAC: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica,
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Saint Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
41 Dominica joined in 2008, and Antigua and Barbuda and Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines joined in 2009.
22

56 Tavis Jules

Latin American and the Caribbean Economic System
Barbados Montserrat and Trinidad and Tobago are not member of Petrocaribe
44 These factors are not all-encompassing but are listed here are the new ‘existential
threats’ that the regional project currently faces for other factors (see Matthew
Louis Bishop et al., ‘Caribbean Regional Integration,’ UWI Institute for
International Relations (2011): 50.
45 ‘The World Economy: The Gated Globe,’ 2013.
46 Lewis, ‘Report of the Technical Working Group,’ 14.
47 Arne Niemann and Philippe Schmitter, ‘Neo-functionalism,’ in Theories of
European Integration, eds. Antje Wiener and Thomas Diez (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2009), 45-66.
48 Niemann and Schmitter, ‘Neo-functionalism,’ 2.
49 The four Councils are: the Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP); the Council
for Trade and Economic Development (COTED); the Council for Foreign and
Community Relations (COFCOR); and the Council for Human and Social
Development (COHSOD).
50 The three bodies are: the Legal Affairs Committee, which provides legal advice to
the organs and bodies of the Community; the Budget Committee, which examines
the draft budget, work program of the CARICOM Secretariat, and submits
recommendations to the Community Council; and the Committee of Central Bank
Governors, which provides recommendations to the COFAP on monetary and
financial matters.
51 Stephen D. Krasner, ed., ‘International Regimes,’ (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983), 1.
52 Susan Strange, ‘Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis’, in
International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1983), 337-354; Krasner, ‘International Regimes,’ 1.
53 Charles Heckscher and Anne Donnellon, eds., The Post-bureaucratic Organization:
New Perspectives on Organizational Change (Newbury Park: Sage, 1994).
54 Heckscher and Donnellon, The Post-bureaucratic Organization, 1994
55 Suriname is a member of this grouping
56 Heiner Hänggi, ‘Interregionalism : Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives,’
(paper prepared for the workshop ‘Dollars, Democracy and Trade: External
Influence on Economic Integration in the Americas,’ Los Angeles, California, May
18, 2000). Accessed at
http://www.cap.unimuenchen.de/transatlantic/download/Haenggi.PDF.
57 Abugattas, Swimming in the Spaghetti Bowl, 2004
58 Dent, ‘From Inter-regionalism to Trans-regionalism,’ 2003.
59 Julie Gilson, ‘New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia,’ Journal of European
Integration, 27 (2005), 307–326.
60 Dent, ‘From Inter-regionalism to Trans-regionalism,’ 2003.
61 Sandra Lavenex and Nicole Wichmann, ‘The External Governance of EU Internal
Security,’ Journal of European Integration, 31 (2009), 83–102.; Sandra Lavenex, ‘A
Governance Perspective on the European Neighbourhood Policy: Integration
Beyond Conditionality?,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 15 (2008), 938–955.
62 Betts, ‘The Global Governance,’ 24.
63 Lavenex, ‘The External Governance,’ 83–102.
64 Lavenex, ‘The External Governance,’ 83–102.
65 Kanishka Jayasuriya, ‘Embedded Mercantilism and Open Regionalism: The Crisis
of a Regional Political Project,’ Third World Quarterly, 24 (2003), 339-355.
66 ‘The Rose Hall Declaration on Regional Governance and Integrated Development,’
2003, 1.
42
43

Caribbean Trans-Regionalism 57

The 1973 Treaty called for the removal of duties on intra-regional trade and
placed high-tariffs on imports from third countries.
68 Jules, ‘Neither World Polity,’ 2012.
69 The political differences between member states stemmed from their differing
economic and political beliefs. This pluralism led to the socialist experiments in
Guyana, guided by Prime Minister Linden Forbes Sampson Burnham from 1966–
1980 and President from1980–1985; Jamaica, aided by Prime Minister Michael
Norman Manley from 1972–1980; and Grenada, under Prime Minister Maurice
Rupert Bishop from 1979–1983.
70 Girvan, N. (2001). Rally round the West Indies, Remarks at the launch of The
Caribbean Community: Beyond Survival, ed. by Kenneth O. Hall (Kingston,
Jamaica: Ian Randle publications, 2001), http: //www.acsaec.org/About/SG/Girvan/ Speeches/reinventc com_eng.htm. (page 1)
71 ‘Grand Anse Declaration and Work Programme for the Advancement of the
Integration Movement,’ last modified July 1989,
http://www.caricom.org/jsp/communications/meetings_statements/grand_anse
_declaration.jsp.
72 Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, Regional Integration and Development
(Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2003)..
73 Originally describe as meta-governance in Bob Jessop, ‘The rise of governance
and the risks of failure: the case of economic development,’ International Social
Science Journal, 50 (1998), 29–45.; later changed to meta-steering in Jessop,
‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,’ 334
74 Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,’ 336.
75 Jessop, ‘Crisis of the National Spatio-Temporal Fix,’ 333.
76 Task Force on Functional Cooperation, 2008 ‘Final report of the Task Force on
Functional Cooperation,’ Georgetown: CARICOM.
77 Tavis D. Jules, ‘‘New Mutualism’ in Micro-states: The AIDS Generation and AIDS
Fatigue in the Caribbean Educational Policy Space,’ in Public HIV/AIDS and
Education Worldwide, eds. Alexander W. Wiseman & Ryan N. Glover (Bingley:
Emerald Publishing, 2012).
78 Jules, ‘‘New Mutualism’ in micro-states,’ 278.
79 Schiff and Winters, ‘Regional Integration,’ 147.
80 ‘Shanique Myrie and the State of Barbados and the State of Jamaica,’ Caribbean
Community Secretariat, accessed at http://caricom.org/shaniquemarie.jsp?null&prnf=1.
81 Intensified functional cooperation is driven by interdependence and gave rise to
greater sectoral harmonization since it aims coordinate policies, procedures, and
practices through defined principles of efficiency and effectiveness across the
region to allow for greater economic integration. Efficiency or ‘hard principles’
reflect the tangible economic results that were the efficacy of functional
cooperation. Principles of effectiveness, the ‘soft principles’ of intensified
functional cooperation, were deviations based upon the human elements and a
common identity fostered by functional cooperation. (see Tavis D. Jules,
‘Re/thinking Harmonization in the Commonwealth Caribbean: Audiences, Actors,
Interests, and Educational Policy Formation,’ Unpublished Ph,D, diss., (Teachers
College, Columbia University, 2008).; Jules, ‘Neither World Polity,’ 2012.
82 Anneke Jessen, ‘CARICOM Report # 2’ (Buenos Aires: Institute for the Integration
of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), 2005).
83 Jessen, ‘Buenos Aires,’ 19
67

